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Abstract:  
 
Adopting an archaeological approach to digital cinema that helps us to 
recognise both the old in the new, and the new in the old, this article argues 
that a ‘skewed’ critical concept of the ‘skeuomorph’ can help us move beyond 
notions of remediation, convergence, and simulacra to better understand the 
complex entanglement of the familiar and the novel that currently defines 
contemporary cinematic form, content, and criticism. Using different examples 
to make our case, we maintain that audiences and filmmakers alike have 
not yet fully adapted to best read or understand the newly emerging digital 
forms, and are thus consequentially ‘not quite seeing them for what they are, 
and always unconsciously trying to understand them in terms of the old and 
familiar’ (Gessler 1998). By drawing attention to several contemporary blind 
spots, our detoured notion of the skeuomorph aims to make the new and 
novel features of digital film palpable.
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In like manner a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates 
it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new 
language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it 
without recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new. 
(Karl Marx, 2000: 327)
In this essay we utilise a ‘digitally detoured’ notion of the ‘skeuomorph’ to better 
understand the ‘gaseous’ form and content of contemporary cinema, arguing in particular 
that this concept entails various nuances that make it a more fecund framework through 
which to consider the aesthetics of digital cinema. Looking in particular at digital 
cinematography and performance, we argue that because of its emphasis on concealed 
and/or misunderstood novelty, the skeuomorphic framework yields a more productive 
understanding of digital cinema than do other terms such as simulation (Baudrillard 
1994), remediation (Bolter and Grusin 2000), and convergence (Jenkins 2007), which 
are characterised by their focus upon ‘pastness.’ Against these, we embrace a ‘skewed’ 
approach to contemporary cinematic artefacts and phenomena, which allows us to 
approach our various objects and loci of study obliquely, or side-on, so that we may 
perceive the complex entanglement of old and new, familiar and novel, pasts and future, 
bound up within the digitalization of modern cinema. Such an approach undoubtedly helps 
situate our project within a broader ‘archaeological’ approach to media, technologies, 
machines, techne, and dispositifs to be found in the works of scholars such as Walter 
Benjamin (2004), Gilbert Simondon (1958), Michel Serres and Bruno Latour (1995), Jean 
Baudrillard (2005), Michel Foucault (2002), Lev Manovich (2001, 2002), Mark B. N. Hansen 
(2004), Jussi Parikka and Erkki Huhtamo (Parikka 2010, 2012, Huhtamo and Parikka 2011), 
and Boris Groys (2014) amongst many others. 
Like many of these forbearers, we too recognize archaeology as an art and practice that is 
always-already about the present; particularly as we aim here to tease out the old features 
lurking within the new, as well as the new features waiting to be re-discovered within the 
old. In taking inspiration from thinkers like Deleuze, Guattari, and Parikka, however, we 
also seek to pervert and to modify that which is nearest and furthest away, in order to 
reveal some of the untapped novelties, and futural becomings (or unbecomings) already 
apparent or latent within our present film technologies and practices. As such, the present 
project also necessarily departs from many of the aforementioned practitioners and their 
methodologies, particularly by foregrounding a ‘skewed’ and ‘skeuomorphic’ nature to 
contemporary filmmaking, films and scholarship––which we maintain can better account 
for the parallelism of past and future (qua actual and virtual) concomitantly operating within 
digital cinema and film going. 
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What is a skeuomorph?
The etymology of ‘Skeu’ stems from the Greek for vessel or implement. Anthropologist 
Nicholas Gessler thus defines a skeuomorph as an ‘element of design or structure that 
serves little or no purpose in the artifact fashioned from the new material but [which] was 
essential to the object made from the original material’ (Gessler, 1998). In other words, 
a skeuomorph is an object or form that anachronistically retains ornamental features or 
design cues from an earlier technological era or method of production—and which no 
longer have any functional purpose. Accordingly, skeuomorphs can be understood as 
‘material metaphors instantiated through our technologies in artifacts’ that either light our 
paths by providing ‘familiar cues to an unfamiliar domain,’ or else serve to ‘lead us astray’ 
(Gessler, 1998). According to Gessler, when ‘yesterday’s functional features become today’s 
stylistic decorations,’ they either begin to constitute a special class of ‘self-deception,’ or 
offer a path into the new and unfamiliar (which, for Gessler, is better than no path at all). In 
this sense, the skeuomorph as a concept should be understood as being simultaneously 
deceptive and helpful.
We encounter examples of skeuomorphic design everywhere in our daily lives—as a stroll 
down any UK high street will amply demonstrate. For example, the modern bollard designs 
used to striate crowd or traffic movement retain skeuomorphic traces of a post-Napoleonic 
war design, wherein decommissioned or captured French cannons were cut and mounted 
with cannon balls in the street. There is no functional purpose for the modern design 
preference for a tapered cylindrical body and ball-top for a bollard, and yet they persist, 
for this is what bollards originally looked like. Passing a couple taking a photograph with 
a digital camera, we hear a shutter sound, an effect introduced via a digital clip when the 
button is activated, and which skeuomorphically mirrors the click of the shutter on older, 
analogue cameras. A car parked opposite displays a faux-walnut veneer on its plastic 
dashboard. And beyond that, a boat moored at the quay is proudly ornamented with 
fiberglass-ribbed planking made to look like wood.
Each of these skeuomorphs exists for different reasons. In time the bollard came to be 
a tool for controlling the direction of human and vehicular traffic; and while its design 
is today skeuomorphic, in that it need not be shaped in the way that it is, it perhaps 
retains elements of functionality because its dimensions and density are useful in 
discouraging drivers of modern cars who might otherwise drive over/through more flimsy 
equivalents. The digital camera’s shutter is not a necessity, but the sound cue enables 
both the photographer and their subjects (particularly if they are human) to know that the 
photograph has been taken (and that they can stop saying ‘cheese’). For diverse reasons, 
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then, we can recognise that skeuomorphs are common––including in the form and content 
of contemporary digital cinema.
As indicated earlier however, we are necessarily detouring the ‘everyday’ understanding 
of the skeuomorph in this outing to help concurrently account for the novel and new 
dimensions that arrive courtesy of new technological formulations. Thus, we aim to expand 
and modify the Greek prefix ‘skeuo’ to simultaneously house, or become possessed by, 
a modern (near homophonic) notion of skewed-ness; with this at once referring to the 
side-on orientation and approach we adopt towards our objects of study, and the skewed 
or oblique path that new skeuomorph machines forge into the unknown. Indeed, we 
might recall that, mathematically speaking, the term skewed means neither to run parallel 
nor to intersect, whilst in everyday parlance the term may also be applied to a part that 
diverges. As such, this concept allows us to approach our objects of study in a skewed 
chronopolitical and pragmatic manner, so that we may bring the past and the future into our 
peripheral vision, and simultaneously account for both the familiarity (pastness) and novelty 
(futurity) of these technologies. Accordingly, our modified and doubly articulated notion 
of the skewed/skeuo offers an oblique polychronic enframing of our different objects of 
study, and makes palpable the latent futural dimensions or new territories opened up by 
their morphological evolution. Which is to say, a futural pole or dimension entirely lacking 
in many other approaches, including Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra, which is laden with 
the baggage of a pastness reworked in the present, or Michel Serres and Bruno Latour’s 
concept of the temporal foldings, or hidden ‘pleats of time’ in-folded into the latest 
technologies, making them appear contemporary only by assemblage. 
To understand the different possibilities that arrive courtesy of our concept, we can briefly 
return to and update Serres’ famous example of the late model car. Indeed, today’s latest 
production line vehicle should be understood as an ensemble of different technologies and 
techniques that are contingently drawn together from, amongst many others, technologies 
emerging from or developed within Neolithic times (the wheel), the Nineteenth century 
(the combustion engine), the Twentieth century (the Air Conditioning Unit), and our own 
digital era (ABS and GPS); which is not to mention all the other sublimated and ‘forgotten’ 
historical technologies and techniques needed to extract and refine metals, build roads, 
vulcanise rubber, mould plastics and extract fossil fuels, which likewise become folded 
into today’s latest mechanised marketable assemblages. However, none of these past 
pleated features is necessarily simulacral or skeuomorphic. For the car’s wheels remain 
round because this is the optimal shape for driving, and not because they are familiar 
material metaphors for earlier wooden chariot or cart wheels. The ‘concrete’ combustion 
engine under the hood is likewise an evolution of its abstract forebears, rather than a 
skeuomorphic modulation thereof (see Simondon 1958). 
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In the following sections we hope to emphasise the often overlooked novel aspects of 
digital cinema by shedding light on why the paradigm shift engendered in cinema by 
digital technology—from actual to virtual, analogue to digital, object to simulation, humanist 
to post-humanist—has not yet appeared to be as radically transformative as typically 
promised. Indeed, many of the skeuomorphic features that contemporary digital cinema 
retains/displays highlight the aetiological or atavistic link between digital cinema and 
its twentieth century, analogue predecessor; these links being for reasons of ‘fashion’ 
rather than ‘function’. However, for this very reason, the skeuomorphic features of digital 
cinema are also deceptive in that they disguise the true nature and power of this precisely 
new medium as they diverge and diversify. We believe, therefore, that audiences and 
filmmakers have not yet learned fully to read or understand the newly emerging forms, and 
as a result, audiences and filmmakers encountering digital forms are still ‘not quite seeing 
them for what they are, and always unconsciously trying to understand them in terms of the 
old and familiar’ (Gessler, 1998).
In the following sections, then, we compare and contrast the ‘humanist’ features of 
twentieth century narrative cinema with their skeuomorphic guises in newer digital forms of 
films and filmmaking (terms with their own skeuomorphic implications). We shall therefore 
consider the role of the camera and camera effects, editing, and finally actors and acting 
as they appear in pre- and post-digital cinema, highlighting where and when skeuomorphic 
trends most overtly appear. We also attempt to keep one eye on theory and criticism, 
highlighting how it, too, is guilty of rhetorical anachronisms, and should increasingly strive 
to create more relevant skeuomorphic neologisms that better address, and adequately 
discuss, the reality of these new forms (or else account for their loosening shackles from 
older technological objects and production processes). Before looking at examples of 
cinematic skeuomorphs, though, we should contrast the skeuomorph with other concepts 
used to define digital cinema, including simulation and remediation.
Simulation, remediation, novelty
Jean Baudrillard (1994) has perhaps written most memorably about simulation, defining 
contemporaneity as being dominated by symbols and signs that have themselves 
‘preceded’ reality. Digital images in cinema often simulate analogue photographs in 
terms of both form (framing and the retention of rectilinear perspective in particular) and 
content (objects that have what Stephen Prince (1996) would term a ‘perceptual realism’). 
The examples that we shall give of skeuomorphic moments in cinema can also be read 
as simulations that function, in the Baudrillardian sense, as signs or symbols, particularly 
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as signs of high production values, which in turn supposedly increases the probability of 
a film’s profitability. However, simulation’s emphasis on signs and symbols lends to the 
concept a sense of ‘pastness’ away from which we would like to move. That is, signs and 
symbols are by definition familiar to us, in that we know already the ‘meanings’ that they 
signify or symbolise. The ‘precession of simulacra’ that Baudrillard defines, then, is the 
process of inhabiting an increasingly legible world in which everything always already has 
an a priori meaning (see Baudrillard, 1994: 1–42). [1]
The element of pastness that characterises simulation also infiltrates the concept of 
remediation, as devised by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000). In Remediation, 
Bolter and Grusin argue that all media (and not uniquely the contemporary digital media 
that are often (still!) referred to as ‘new media’) ‘remediate’ older media. That is, they 
consciously appropriate the forms of older media. With regard to cinema, they suggest 
that remediation is also a form of hypermediation; our belief that the dinosaurs in Jurassic 
Park (Steven Spielberg, USA, 1993) are realistic is based not upon our having actually seen 
a dinosaur against which we could measure the film’s creatures, but against previous, 
mediated dinosaurs that we have seen in other films, television shows, comic books and 
drawings. [2] In other words, we understand media through other media, hence ‘new 
media’ having a ‘double logic’ of hypermediacy and remediation (see Bolter and Grusin, 
2000: 147–158).
Grusin has gone on to argue that in addition to remediation, cinema in particular also 
functions via ‘premediation’ (2004). This does not mean that cinema simply predicts the 
future (whether or not it does so accurately), but it does mean that cinematic visions of 
the future help us a priori to understand the future: ‘the future is remediated before it 
even happens... [and] the future is remediated at the very moment that it emerges into 
the present’ (Grusin, 2004: 29). In other words, films like Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 
USA, 1995) and Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, USA, 2002) function as a form of 
premediation by not only depicting future media technologies as remediations of current/
past media technologies, but they also provide us with a means to understand the future, 
such that catastrophes such as the destruction of New York’s World Trade Center in 2001, 
when they do happen, ‘never catch us unawares’ (Grusin 2004: 36). [3]
Like simulation, remediation and premediation are important and useful concepts for 
understanding digital cinema, but the element of ‘pastness’ involved in remediation tends 
to negate precisely what might be new about new media technologies. That is, new media 
technologies, with digital cinema here as our focus, might well simulate and/or remediate 
old(er) media technologies, but this does not mean that their novelty consists uniquely in 
their ability to remix what already exists. In other words, we contend that there is novelty in 
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digital cinema—and the concept of the skeuomorph helps to make this clear, because while 
skeuomorphic designs are understood consciously or unconsciously to make the new feel 
familiar or comfortable (at least initially), the skeuomorph also affirms positively that there 
is something ‘new’.
Cognitively speaking, humans at birth are exposed to sights – if not necessarily sounds 
(there is sound in the womb) – that are new to them, but which they quickly learn to 
recognise. Given that humans, as a supersaturated species once acculturated to the 
‘songs’ and ‘rhythms’ of their highly technological environments, communicate with others 
and machines not just linguistically but also functionally – that is, by picking out the salient 
qualities of the world that surrounds us in a fashion similar to our peers/conspecifics – 
we could argue that perception itself is a matter of remediation. In her ‘schizoanalysis of 
contemporary screen culture’, Patricia Pisters argues that in our current era of ‘perception 
2.0’, the proliferation of digital screens and images surrounding us formulate the external 
brains to and with which human brains naturally connect and nerve (Pisters, 2012: 305). 
Taking inspiration from Gilles Deleuze’s thinking about cinema, and updating his concepts 
to better account for our contemporary era, Pisters argues that the feature of the digital 
neuro-image that becomes most unusual is its positing a form of thinking from the future. 
Indeed, Pisters argues that ‘[i]f the movement-image is founded in the first synthesis of 
time of the present, and the time-image is grounded in the second synthesis of the past, 
the neuro-image belongs to the third synthesis of time, the time of the future’ (Pisters 
2013: 303). From this vantage, both past and present become dimensions of ‘the (always 
speculative) future, with the third synthesis of time becoming ‘related to the creation of the 
new, to hope for the future, an eternal recurrence of “difference,” but also to death (death 
as the future for all of us, but a future that also calls for rebeginnings)’ (Pisters 2013: 304). 
Briefly to touch upon wider discourses of difference and repetition, which are relevant but 
which we do not have space to investigate in depth here, we know that there is not just 
repetition. If there were only repetition, the world would itself become blinding, or invisible, 
because if everything were the same/repeated endlessly we would exist in a disorientating/
disorientated ganzfeld in which we would be incapable of telling one thing apart from 
another. In the spirit of Deleuze and Friedrich Nietzsche, then, we would say that there is 
difference, and that the extension of difference manifests itself as novelty, even if we can 
only recognise difference through the support of repetition. In other words, when we say 
that digital cinema is novel, we acknowledge that our recognition of its novelty relies in 
certain respects on a kind of cognitive remediation. But where Grusin (and Bolter) do not 
look beyond re- or pre-mediation and at the novel itself, the skeuomorph hopefully allows 
us to push beyond simulation of pastness and to encounter a novel third synthesis of 
time qua a thinking from the future which is also immanently and virtually bound up within 
present digital technologies. 
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Cinema as old or new medium?
In addition to Bolter and Grusin’s work on ‘remediation’, Lev Manovich has written about 
how digital cinema is in certain respects ‘an old medium [passing itself off ] as [a] new 
medium’ (Manovich, 2002), while Jan Simons has discussed cinema as a ‘new medium as 
old medium’ (Simons, 2002). That is, Manovich says that digital special effects films ‘aim 
to show us something extraordinary: something we have never seen before,’ while both 
digital special effects films and films shot on digital video (DV) show us ‘familiar reality in 
a new way’ (Manovich, 2002: 212). However, while this may be their aim, ‘the aesthetics of 
special effects and DV realism... are not new in cinema history’ (Manovich, 2002: 217), in 
that both special effects and documentary-style realism have existed simultaneously since 
the earliest Lumière brothers’ films. Writing in the era before cloud computing, Manovich 
argues that digital cinema is, therefore, both new and not, with cinema only truly destined 
to become ‘new’ when the unprecedented storage capacity of computers becomes utilised, 
and when users can ‘interface’ with all of the cinema uploaded on to these memory 
devices in novel ways (Manovich, 2002: 217). In our present era of prosumer slash-fiction, 
mash-ups, movie memes and fansubbing, it appears we have indeed taken one step closer 
to this reality.
Meanwhile, Simons argues that new media themselves do not necessarily remediate 
their predecessors, because ‘[n]ew media may simply not have been designed with such 
a purpose in mind’ (Simons, 2002: 240). Simons also proposes that we recognise the 
metaphorical nature of the conceptual frameworks that we use to theorise films. This latter 
point is perhaps particularly useful, in that the skeuomorph is, with regard to film theory, 
a novel concept, but it is also a metaphor. The skeuomorph is not the perfect definition of 
digital cinema, but it functions as a lens to bring out what we perceive as the novel and, 
in accordance with Simons, the non-remediated aspects of digital cinema, even if these 
also follow on from the aesthetic traditions that Manovich identifies, and even if these 
persist within a cinematic institution that relies upon the traditional spectatorial model that 
Manovich seeks to overthrow.
Simons goes on to declare that digital cinema is neither a ‘new medium as old medium,’ 
nor an ‘old medium as new medium,’ but quite simply ‘a new medium, bringing forth 
correspondingly new practices and new forms’ (Simons, 2007: 51). With regard to special 
effects films, Chuck Tryon seems to concur with Manovich when he argues that ‘the 
newness of special effects is recycled, reworked, and revisited’ (Tryon, 2009: 39). In other 
words, we ought to recognise that discourses of the novel, together with concomitant 
backlashes against precisely the novelty of the effects that we see (Tryon, for example, 
highlights digital’s continuities with, rather than its break from, analogue cinema; see Tryon, 
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2009: 171), have characterised much work in film studies over the last twenty years with 
regard to the digital and its effects on film. And yet, like Simons, we feel that digital cinema 
is (or was) new (even if we still refer to it—or remediate it—as, precisely, cinema, an ‘old(er)’ 
medium). Let us look, then, at how this is so.
From cameras to Skeuo-cam devices
Paleontologically speaking, and as many ‘media archaeologists’ have demonstrated 
(see Huhtamo and Parikka 2011), the evolution of the movie camera is long and complex, 
involving the assemblage and refinement of various technologies. These include the 
camera obscura, the camera lucida, the heliographic techniques of Nicéphore Niépce, 
William Henry Fox Talbot and Louis Daguerre, pre-cinematic forms of animation or light 
show, the proto-cinematic (photographic) experiments of Étienne-Jules Marey and 
Eadweard Muybridge, and the changing cinematic inventions (amongst countless others) 
that have taken place since Thomas Edison and Auguste and Louis Lumière respectively 
began to make films.
However, we can outline the movie camera as a ‘black box’ or technological device that 
mechanically feeds strips of photosensitive film through its apparatus to capture a series 
of still, indexical photographs. These motion cameras necessarily employ optical lens 
technology, fashioned through smoothed glass (after the biological precursors found in 
animal eyes), which serve to prehend, refract or transmit light into the darkened camera 
chamber where it is focused on to a mobile recording surface that advances several 
times/frames a second. This recording surface is typically composed of a thin layer of 
photo-sensitive chemical mounted on to strips of film stock (originally celluloid, but later 
polyester), which are subsequently processed and set to produce negatives (a footprint), 
and then turned into positives (or a cast) for the purposes of projection.
Early camera equipment was necessarily bulky and immobile, limited to framing only the 
objects or scenes set in front of its monocular gaze. Throughout the Twentieth century, 
however, cameras became ever smaller and more mobile, with mechanical automation 
replacing the original hand-cranked film advancement system. Film stock itself developed 
sprockets for a more smooth mechanical advancement, and reels gradually became longer 
(and wider) and able to capture images for greater periods of time. By the late 1920s, film 
stock also began to capture sound, which, after much experimentation, was eventually 
recorded on to a magnetic strip running along the film’s periphery. Concomitant to these 
technological developments were ever-new ‘languages’ or modes of cinematic expression. 
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With the development of lighter, more mobile cameras, for instance, came dolly techniques, 
hand-held shots, and the aesthetic of the Steadicam; and, latterly, SnorriCam tropes (shots 
taken with a camera attached to the actor). 
Although by no means exhaustive, this brief history sketches out the main material/
technological features of twentieth century ‘mechanical movie cameras’ with which we wish 
to engage here. However, while the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the birth 
of mechanical movie cameras, as Barbara Creed argues, the end ultimately witnessed its 
death, at the point where digital and virtual cameras began to appear (Creed, 2000: 79). 
Similarly, for Manovich, the advent of digital cinema served to mark a paradigmatic shift from 
the predominantly indexical legacy of the kino-eye, to the new age of the kino-brush, which 
is more akin to animation, or ‘painting in time’ (Manovich, 2001: 302). Parikka takes issue 
with the metaphor of painting, however, particularly as the digital media moves us away 
from ‘the gesturality of the painter, the hand and the use of colours on canvas’ and more 
precisely belongs to a ‘culture of coding and encoding colour intensities in a gridded pixel 
space’ (Parikka 2012: 36). In his rendering of the same shift from an era of ocular-centrism 
to a new era of the embodied ‘viewing’ (and feeling) of digital images, Thomas Elsaesser 
(2008) suggests that the new digital era accordingly presents itself as a heuristic event, 
or a Foucauldian dispotif, which allows us to ‘reflect upon one’s present understanding 
of both film history and cinema theory’ (Elsaesser, 2008: 232; quoted in Parikka, 2012: 
22). What interests us here, though, is the manner in which this technological death or 
transubstantiation is initially (and still) disavowed, and how newly emerging digital forms 
skeuomorphically refuse, at least initially, to drop the design features of the earlier models, 
albeit whilst forging forwards into new, uncharted territories. We shall examine this issue by 
turning our attention to a recent film marketed as being the most advanced technologically 
in cinema history, Avatar (James Cameron, USA, 2009).
As is perhaps already well known, Avatar was made using a whole raft of expensive/
experimental technological innovations and hybrid techniques, yet none appear more 
technologically skeuomorphic than the device James Cameron used for ‘shooting’ the 
film in/on ‘location’ inside a huge green screen stage platform, known as ‘the volume’. 
Cameron was seen (and shown in countless publicity images) to retain the use of a physical 
camera-like ‘recording’ device for most of the film’s shooting. Cinefex reporter Jody Duncan 
points out how a team at Technoprops had assumed that Cameron—as a twentieth century 
director—would be most comfortable with a camera device that ‘seemed familiar’ (Duncan, 
2010: 86). Thus, virtual-production supervisor Glenn Derry was challenged to design a 
device that ‘would look and handle much like a typical motion picture camera, complete 
with tubular eyepiece’ (Duncan, 2010: 86). This prop-device, referred to as a ‘swing-cam’ 
(Thompson, 2010) or a ‘simulcam’ (Duncan, 2010), displays and records digital objects and 
environments rather than the actual reality (seen by humans) before it. By recording images 
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that are not before the swing-cam, the object appears ontologically distinct from previous 
models of photographic movie cameras, which relied on profilmic material in order to 
function. Skeuomorphically, however, we continue to conceive of the swing-cam through 
the vocabulary, design and functionality of traditional, analogue cameras.
This skeuomorphic object in certain respects only bears a superficial resemblance to an 
analogue camera, being a ‘somewhat camera-shaped object’ replete with a digital interface 
that can stream real-time motion capture and map it on to digital characters within their 
digital environments (Duncan, 2010: 86). Cameron dubbed this skeuo-cam device the 
‘swing-cam’ due to its attached screen’s ability to swing to any angle, thereby granting 
operators a greater (unlimited) freedom of movement (Thompson 2010). Although Cameron 
would point the swing-cam at his actors (who would be wearing Motion Capture suits on a 
green screen sound stage), much like he would were he shooting on location or in a studio, 
there the similarity between this skeuo-cam and the analogue cameras ends. For, as Anne 
Thompson illustrates, the swing-cam has no lens, but rather ‘an LCD screen and markers 
that record its position and orientation within the volume relative to the actors’ (Thompson, 
2010). The position information built into the camera, like a modern GPS system, ‘is then 
run through an effects switcher, which feeds back low-resolution CG versions of both the 
actors and the environment of Pandora to the swing-cam’s screen in real time’ (Thompson, 
2010). By pointing this skeuo-cam object at Sigourney Weaver, say, Cameron could look 
into the eyepiece and see ‘a videogame version of the avatar character, in real time, 
moving and acting as another being’ (Thompson, 2010). Furthermore, as he moved the 
camera-object’s ‘recording end’ around the stage, his viewfinder would present not a visual 
image of the stage, but rather the fictive digital world that the characters were supposed 
to be in (Duncan, 2010: 75). We have here, then, a complete reversal of traditional 
filmmaking: rather than build a set or find a location through which the camera then moves, 
Cameron instead moves his camera through low-definition images that are then made into 
high-definition images for the finished film.
What is more, the swing-cam also allowed Cameron to shoot a scene by moving through 
the volume, so that he ‘could either pick up the camera and shoot actors photographically, 
as the performance occurred, or he could reshoot any scene by walking through the 
empty soundstage with the device after the actors were gone, capturing different camera 
angles as the scene replayed’ (Thompson, 2010). In this sense, the swing-cam retains a 
three dimensional volumetric ‘memory’ of all movements within a digitally composited 
space, along with an infinite number of virtual views and vectors thereof (from all possible 
vantage points, including those impossible for humans to access unaided). In this way, 
multiple alignments and perspectives can be tried, tested, rejected and re-explored hours, 
days, weeks or even years after recording and acting are completed. The skeuomorphic 
dimensions of the technological object thus point to both a real and mediated dimension, 
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as well as a past and futural pole. Indeed, the familiarity of the object in its simulation of 
past technological artefacts is here counterbalanced by the introduction of a range of 
novel features that were not anticipated or remediated in the older form. The swing-cam 
thus becomes a camera-like object (a skeuo-cam) that boasts a fluid and continuous 
memory of recorded movement and action from within a supersaturated software-rendered 
volume. 
The skeuo-cam also allowed Cameron to synthesise a variety of other ancillary cinematic 
techniques, which transcend the capabilities of all previous camera forms in radically 
new ways. Derry describes this new camera-object as a form of digital ‘interface’, feeding 
directly into a digital program known as MotionBuilder. He further outlines how this 
interface granted Cameron ‘the ability to scale things, to fly around, to do everything a 
camera operator would do’, such as zoom, replicate camera moves (like a dolly or crane 
shot), or even perform ‘scale variations’ from the microscopic to the macroscopic. In 
this manner, the operator can perform huge crane moves by adjusting ‘the scale’ of the 
view and moving the material-object with their hands. Derry explains how this offers the 
operator an ability to start a scene 1,000 metres above the diegetic world, ‘and arrive at a 
close-up, say, at the exact moment an actor/character delivered a line’ (quoted in Duncan, 
2010: 86).
In other words, as per our brief discussion of cameras earlier, the technological 
developments involving the ‘swing-cam’ bring with them aesthetic possibilities heretofore 
impossible outside of (non-photorealistic) animation. If film history has been characterised 
by increasing the mobility of the camera, as well as by the possibility of recording for 
longer, now camera movement is entirely unconstrained, as are the time limits on shot 
duration. In part this is because there is no longer a physical camera needed for the 
making of a film like Avatar; the ‘swing-cam’ skeuomorphically resembles a camera, but 
in other, important, senses it is not a camera at all. Similarly, when a film cuts, it does so 
simply out of ongoing convention, and not, as per analogue cinema, out of necessity (as 
a result of a reel running out or the camera not being able to fit through a door). While 
Philip Rosen (2001: 331–332) is correct, therefore, to highlight how many filmmakers do 
not pursue the novel possibilities of digital cinema, in that digital cinema tends to look 
like analogue cinema, he also perhaps overlooks the very novelty that digital cinema does 
allow. Furthermore, while Boris Groys (2014) has offered a detailed analysis of how it is an 
old technique to promote the new, this does not mean that new things do not come into 
being. Ethically, we seek not to ‘prefer’ either the old or the new (see Groys, 2014: 7); we 
simply wish to identify that digital cinema does have novel aspects, and that we should 
recognise these (even if initially using ‘old’ frameworks) if we wish to understand it.
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Various other visual effects and features visually hark back to the analogue era in a 
skeuomorphic fashion that recalls the physical reality of hand-held cameras, glass lenses 
and film stock. In Beowulf (Robert Zemeckis, USA, 2007), for example, many of the battle 
scenes employ a form of ‘hand-held shot’ that appears to invoke a humanist aesthetic: 
slight ‘camera shakes’ suggest the immediacy and authenticity of a human observer/
operator, as per the (predominantly) analogue battle scenes of films like Braveheart (Mel 
Gibson, USA, 1995). Other camera ‘effects’ retain features that appear linked to a ‘surplus’ 
of information originally ‘captured’ by the older kino-eye technology. Lens flare, or the 
effects of direct sunlight shining through the glass lens of a camera is one example of 
such a surplus feature. The gathering of rain droplets, or blood, upon the camera’s glass 
lens provide other notable examples. Even though made using ‘cameras’ that do not have 
lenses, moments from films like Star Trek (J.J. Abrams, USA, 2009) have faux lens flare 
added to various images, while water/blood spatterings are increasingly painted into 
the digital frame in a host of contemporary (predominantly blockbuster) movies. In other 
words, these effects are skeuomorphs that simulate a familiar ‘cinematic view’ of ‘recorded’ 
events.
While both simulations and remediations of analogue cinema, these skeuomorphic 
moments also point to the novelty of digital cinema. Implicit in skeuomorphic moments, 
this novelty becomes explicit during the rain of ash that falls following the destruction of 
the Home Tree in Avatar and the falling snow sequences of A Christmas Carol (Robert 
Zemeckis, USA, 2009). In these examples, the lack of a lens on the digital ‘camera’ (and 
the lack of a screen border invoked by Digital 3D (D3D) projection (for a consideration 
of this, see Purse, 2013: 134–149) allows atmospheric information to flow freely between 
skeuo-cam and recording surface, between diegesis and auditorium. Such effects are part 
of the new language of digital cinema, and do not skeuomorphically translate back into the 
traditional language of analogue cinema.
Skeuomorphs, then, can be understood as connoting a ‘cinematic’ authenticity, reality, or 
familiarity that helps build the path into the new. On account of such features, scholars 
like Scott McQuire and D.N. Rodowick argue that industrialised standards of photorealism 
remain the ‘holy grail’ for CGI effects within the digital age, with CGI being judged against 
a ‘camera reality’ rather than any objective realism (see McQuire, 1997: 5; Rodowick, 
2007). Thus, many digital effects are not so much concerned with creating a perfect 
image, but rather of reproducing an anachronistic camera-like image. As discussed, these 
digital forms deliberately incorporate fake ‘flaws’ like edge halation, motion blur, and 
even grain to appear humanist (McQuire, 1997: 5). For Barbara Creed, these phenomena 
suggest that a century of watching cinematic images has resulted in a perceptual shift, 
such that the cinema-going public’s cultural point of reference has shifted from the real 
world to ‘cinematic’ representations thereof, which have become our common ground of 
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comparison (Creed, 2000: 85). If this is the case, then it is only natural that early forms of 
digital cinema would so slavishly fashion the new through skeuomorphs of the old, the 
comfortable and the familiar as it discovers and un-conceals new possibilities.
Beyond camera-objects and skeuo-cam effects, there also persists a rhetorical use of 
the term ‘camera’ within critical discourses to describe the vantage point or perspective 
from within the diegetic universe, where essentially there is/was no camera at all. As 
discussed, programmers and directors increasingly decide where to position virtual 
framing perspectives and to play with their respective scales from within the digitised 
volume. They do not, in this sense, use any actual camera (or skeuo-cam object). These 
forms of digital perspective, which are commonly used to frame the diegetic action within 
the digitally composited worlds of, say, Shrek (Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson, USA, 
2001) and Wall-E (Andrew Stanton, USA, 2008), are completely virtual entities, formulating 
virtual axes/potential lines of sight within the volume of rendered digital space. Now, we 
may argue that animation has always done this – and it is not our intention to suggest 
otherwise. However, the digital filmmaker can play around with and modify her images with 
ease as she navigates the 3D space of the film’s diegesis with the skeuo-cam, while the 
traditional animator would not be able to do this except mentally and/or with impossible 
amounts of labour involved.
Edward Branigan (2006) further problematises these issues in his book-length exploration 
into the different critical uses of the term ‘camera’ within traditional film theory and history. 
Drawing a distinction between the nature of film itself and the language used by theorists 
to describe its various manifestations, he shows how the term ‘camera’ is often polluted or 
used as a stand-in for different things such as ‘a shot, image, frame, motion, motion picture, 
motivation, point of view, and narration’ (2006: xiv). The critical use of the term is also 
often falsely anthropomorphised, imagined as an objective tool for observing a profilmic 
reality, or endowed with a subconscious of its own. The term camera is thus used as an 
aid to implant meaning into a film, fluctuating in a ‘twilight area between material object 
and interpretive subject, between world and language’ (Branigan, 2006: 96). Exploring 
eight different critical uses of the term camera, Branigan also exposes how theorists 
have traditionally employed descriptions of camera movements, framings and effects 
as linguistic metaphors for how a film focalises, scrutinises, draws attention to, signals, 
highlights, or else grants significance to objects or things. Building on similar objections, 
Daniel Frampton (2006) moves forward to advocate an altogether new conceptualisation 
and description of what he calls ‘film-thinking’ and ‘film-thought’ to better describe how 
a film invites viewers to see and think through sound and images. For us, irrespective of 
the confusing baggage picked up over a century of uses and misuses, the terminology 
increasingly appears as a critical skeuomorphic trend, and to continue discussing any 
view into a cinematic world as belonging to, or emanating from a ‘camera’ becomes less 
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acceptable. Contemporary discussions of cameras must thus be recognised for what they 
are, critically and academically familiar and rhetorically comfortable.
Editing
In Cinema 2, Gilles Deleuze, after Robert Lapoujade, observes an aesthetic shift from 
montage to montrage in post-war cinema, which recalls André Bazin’s predilection for the 
long takes and deep focus of Orson Welles and Jean Renoir over the montage cinema 
of Sergei M. Eisenstein (Deleuze, 2005: 40). In the post-war context, Deleuze observed 
that the new cinema was no longer defined by cuts, but rather continuity and showing 
(‘montrer’ in French). Pace David Bordwell (2006: 117–189), William Brown has argued 
that digital technology plays a key role in ‘intensifying’ the continuity/’montrage’/’monstro
us’ nature of contemporary cinema (Brown, 2009b). Elsewhere, we take this even further, 
introducing a Deleuze-inflected model of ‘gaseous’ virtual camera perception found in the 
digitally rendered filmic spaces of Beowulf (see Brown 2009b), Fight Club (David Fincher, 
USA, 1999) and Enter the Void (Gaspar Noé, France/Germany/Italy/Canada, 2009) (see 
Brown 2009a; Brown and Fleming 2011). Here, cinematic space and time are understood 
to be traversed and viewed by a purely digitally composited perspective, often marked by 
flowing perceptual passages ‘through’ psyche and physics (solid objects and the space 
between them). Again, such shots are not captured by any form of physical camera as we 
traditionally understand it.
In ‘gaseous cinema’, we argue, the free-form movement through digital time and space 
is marked by a conspicuous lack of cuts, and replaced by a continuous flowing mode of 
spatial and temporal perception. The skeuo-cam perspective offered in these filmic worlds 
increasingly becomes free to pass through memory and matter, time and space without 
recourse to any (apparent) cutting whatsoever. Although the option of using montage 
and/or continuity has long been available to filmmakers, the ability to pass through solid 
objects—in an unbroken flowing manner—is something both unique and effortless to new 
digital forms. In both Fight Club and Enter the Void, for instance, a virtual skeuo-cam is 
able to pass effortlessly through and into the human body, freely flowing into and out 
of a skull or uterus. These skeuo-cam moments also typically pass through solid walls 
and architecture that previously would have divided or segmented diegetic space (and 
require cutting to traverse). These gaseous perspectives also display an ability to change 
scale at will, to depict firing neurons within the human brain in Fight Club, or microscopic 
spermatozoa swimming up the fallopian tubes in Enter the Void during shots that later 
also feature, say, a whole human head that takes up as much of the frame as these other, 
‘microscopic’ features. Furthermore, these films also seamlessly blend physics and psyche, 
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or gaseously pass through matter and memory/fantasy whilst actively refolding them as a 
single and continuous plane.
Admittedly, these tropes were often attempted within analogue films such as Citizen Kane 
(Orson Welles, USA, 1941) as is evidenced by the bravura takes that move through the neon 
lights outside the El Rancho bar and move ‘inside’ through the bar’s skylight via a dissolve. 
These particular ‘superhuman’ perspectives were only achieved by hiding the cut and 
editing shots together, but they were not always hidden well. In digital cinema, new modes 
of spatial and temporal passage are increasingly marked by an intensified speed and a 
seamless continuity, which ultimately renders editing and cutting an expressive choice rather 
than a technological necessity. That is, editing techniques retain their own unique powers 
and forms of cinematic thought/expression, with the dialectical style remaining a useful 
tool within the filmmaker’s toolbox. What is more, in its very nature, editing can express 
different, non-gaseous modes of perception. Stanley Kubrick’s most famous montage cut 
from 2001: A Space Odyssey (UK/USA, 1968), for instance, elides 150,000 years of human 
evolution in a single cut from a prehistoric bone-tool to a satellite orbiting Earth – and is 
powerful exactly because it utilises a cut, or an aesthetic interstice that simultaneously 
elides two vastly distinct moments in time and signals an ellipsis of information. It is the cut 
itself that gives this particular form of cinematic expression its affect, and no digital morph 
could claim to offer the same power or to reflect the film’s themes as effectively – although 
films like Russkiy kovcheg/Russian Ark (Aleksandr Sokurov, Russia/Germany, 2002) do move 
through different time frames without a cut, as the film takes us from the era of Peter the 
Great to Catherine the Great to Nicholas and Alexandra and to the contemporary world in 
its 98-minute single-take duration. As Russian Ark implies, digital cinema retains cutting and 
editing as a skeuomorphic convention, which only hides the ‘gaseous’ spatial and temporal 
perception that digital technology can otherwise allow. The example of Star Wars Episode 
One: The Phantom Menace (George Lucas, USA, 1999) provides a good case in point here. 
Although Lucas ostensibly made this prequel using the latest (1999) technological and digital 
imaging devices, the form of the new film clearly echoes that of the earlier 1970s and 1980s 
trilogy, comprehensively conforming to their framing devices and cinematic grammar. In 
this sense, the more recent prequel films are guilty of translating new cinematic forms back 
into the familiar vocabulary of what Marx, in our prefatory quotation, might term the ‘mother 
tongue’, for purposes of continuity and familiarity. But we can extend this example beyond 
the Star Wars film cycle, and apply it to the digital film cycle more generally.
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Skeuomorphic Actors
Critical discourses surrounding the appearance and development of digital actors usually 
focus upon the extreme cases of what have become known as synthespians, cyberstars, or 
vactors (virtual actors). Here, however, we wish to engage with how traditional carbon-based 
actors and CGI have increasingly moved into a formal relation, whilst critical discourses 
persist in retaining skeuomorphic allusions to previous traditions (for ease and comfort), by 
regularly attributing performance to a single star or actor—even if this increasingly seems 
unjust if we look at and below the surface. In the digital age, the traditional conflation of 
actors with character (or more specifically, the concept of actors as individual singularities 
external to the film), should increasingly be revised so that actors are seen as contributors 
to an internal digital multiplicity, and viewed as collaborators who contribute certain skills to 
the realisation of the final character or role.
D.N. Rodowick views the new ‘cyborg fusions’ of actors and digital information—wherein 
CGI is increasingly used to efface and even rewrite the actor’s body—as a part-human and 
part-synthetic ‘Frankenstein hybrid’ (Rodowick, 2007: 8). We take Rodowick’s ‘hybrid’ even 
further, however, as we recognise the multiplicity’s ability to fluctuate and intensively change 
throughout narrative time. Like a swarm, the multiple as actor can be viewed as a single 
organism (the character), or as a collection of smaller contributors at different times or under 
different forms of observation. In other words, new forms of human-digital performer are 
best understood as a multiplicity or assemblage, which incorporates countless human parts 
(and human-hours), heterogeneous forces, and digital features. We thus believe that critics 
should, when relevant, discuss actors as contributors to new digital forms that constitute 
complex and multifaceted trans-human assemblages. Actors and stars in the digital age 
should accordingly no longer be synonymous with, nor held fully responsible for, the role’s 
final performance, no more than the director should be held fully responsible for everything 
that appears within the multiplicity of the film. 
Here we wish to offer three key examples to illustrate our point: Andy Serkis’ contributions 
to Gollum in the Lord of the Rings films (Peter Jackson, New Zealand/USA, 2001–2003), Brad 
Pitt’s contributions to the eponymous hero of The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (David 
Fincher, USA, 2009), and Sam Worthington’s work within Jake Sully’s Na’vi double in Avatar.
As a starting point, we would like to engage with an exclusively digital technique 
increasingly popular for generating roles within digital cinema: Motion Capture, or MoCap. 
Stephen Keane describes ‘motion capture’ as a procedure designed to capture an actor’s 
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physical movements as a ‘reference point’ for a digitally rendered character (Keane, 2007: 
156). This is usually achieved by the actor wearing a mono-coloured suit adorned with 
motion sensors that allow a computer to track and store the performance as pure digital 
information. From a posthuman perspective, actors are not so much filmed any more, 
as tracked in what L. Marshall (2007: 3) calls their ‘computer pajamas’ (see also Brown, 
2009b: 162). Computers are thereafter used to translate the captured motion of the 
performance into digital code, which is only outputted in a visual format resembling human 
perception in post-production (Brown, 2009b: 161). These techniques are increasingly 
supplemented by ‘facial’ and ‘e-motion’ capture to give the character expressive 
capabilities, with the combination of the two techniques termed ‘performance capture.’ 
Keane offers the character of Gollum from the Lord of the Rings films as an example, 
describing him as a ‘combination of elements’ that move beyond motion capture and pure 
digital imagery. Serkis originally wore a MoCap suit to contribute his performance to the 
Gollum role, both with other actors and alone on a sound stage. Later, Serkis was visually 
removed from the film and replaced by an animated creature that retained a trace of his 
earlier kinetic performance. The visual design of the creature was carried out by artists 
and digital animators using Serkis’ face as a reference point, but their various contributions 
also add to the overall feel and performative effect of the final character/role. Serkis can 
here best be understood as a form of analogue puppeteer behind the virtual Gollum, 
whose expressive capabilities are also assisted by digital animators in their own right 
(above and beyond Serkis’ performance capabilities). For Keane, Gollum thus physically, 
technologically and emotionally provides an example of what he describes ‘as a very 
layered performance’ (Keane, 2007: 72–73).
It is important to bear in mind Mark J.P. Wolf ’s argument that performance has, through 
the use of body, stunt and hand doubles, make-up artists, and more, long since been 
a ‘technological construction’ (Wolf, 2003). Nonetheless, motion captured digital 
performance can ‘still matter’ in a posthuman cinema, especially if considered through the 
Deleuzian lens of the geste. The geste is Deleuze’s term for ‘elements that are irrelevant 
to the narrative construction of the cinematic depiction’, and which allow viewers to 
see the body not as simply a part of a story, but as ‘a living entity, despite any digital 
make-up, transformation, or extreme disregard for nature laws’ (Hadjioannou, 2008: 135; 
see also Brown, 2009b; Fleming, 2012, 2013). From this perspective, the corporeality of a 
performance is reasserted in digital form so that the digital body becomes ‘a role.’ Thus, 
there remains room for a re-emphasis of the body as a performative or even affective-
performative force in motion capture cinema because there remains a continuity in 
performance. Indeed, if one actor is employed for the capture, the continuous ‘physicality’ 
of their performance can be ‘re-foregrounded in a theatrical way’ (Brown, 2009b: 162). 
This view is somewhat problematised by a film like The Curious Case of Benjamin Button 
however, since here multiple actors provide the character’s body throughout the film, 
digital animators contribute to its ‘performance’, a film star provides the raw data for its 
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facial movements, and yet a single role or geste is maintained (Fleming, 2012: 200–208). 
Accordingly, the continuous role of Benjamin was not asserted through a continuous 
body performance or ‘theatrical’ role, but rather emerged through a variegated galaxy 
of different performances and technologies (including editing) composited from different 
times and spaces. And yet, although this new technological capability was highly 
publicised on the film’s release, many reviews unproblematically focused upon Pitt’s lead 
performance, overlooking the fact that the actual role of Benjamin was ‘performed’ by 
an assemblage of different body actors, computer technologies, and digital animators 
above and beyond Pitt’s facial-performance capture. This photo-real character that is born 
old and fated to grow younger (and eventually to lose his memory) here surfaces as a 
material metaphor for the fate of the cinematic actor in the digital age (see Fleming, 2012). 
That is, the actor is reborn and radically freed from the indexical ‘memory’ of recording 
cameras, and is now able to become more powerful and affective thanks to the skewed 
technological interface with other human and inhuman actors and actants (see Fleming, 
2012).
Another filmic role that seemingly reflects upon this paradigm shift in acting and 
performance can be unearthed in the Na’vi creatures of Avatar, which diegetically and 
extra-diegetically formulate a synthesis of computer technologies and human DNA. 
Jake Sully’s Na’vi avatar is a part-human, part-technological assemblage that seamlessly 
synthesises human, alien and digital technologies in a new and productive way. Extra-
diegetically, over and above Worthington’s captured body movements, which invisibly 
interlace with the movements and actions of unseen stunt men and performance doubles, 
the Na’vi avatar also incorporates animation used to grant affective life to the creature’s 
expressive tail and other non-human physiognomy. The animators thus work with the 
captured human performance as raw data, adding to, and subtracting from the original 
performance as necessary in a bid to create a separate role. In this sense, a digital 
interface and multiple human performances (both actual and animated) also enter into the 
performative and affective assemblage.
For Daniel Frampton, digital animators become the new gods of the digital cinematic world, 
‘able to show anything, be anything, go anywhere, think anything’ as well as perform in 
new ways that necessarily transgress the limitations of the all too human (Frampton, 2006: 
205). Our conclusion here is that digital technology has taken cinema into the realm of the 
trans-human – even if we still consider these performances skeuomorphically to be carried 
out by a single actor, and even if most filmmakers still use these trans-human techniques 
to make films that claim to be about human characters. The logical extension of this, 
though, is the morph, in which we see a character change from one form to another before 
our very eyes – as happens in The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring when 
Bilbo Baggins (Ian Holm) sees the titular ring on the person of his nephew Frodo (Elijah 
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Wood), and transforms suddenly into a sharp-toothed demon as he reaches for it. As the 
depiction of space becomes ‘gaseous’, so, too, does the depiction of characters and the 
characters themselves. In short, then, many films are made according to the traditions and 
conventions that developed/emerged due to the limitations of the analogue technology 
used to make films (which is not to overlook industrial and economic factors and pressures, 
or the possibility that various analogue techniques may in fact capture viewers’ attention in 
efficient, perhaps even ‘natural’ ways, as Brown has explored elsewhere (see Brown 2011). 
However, our argument here is that they need not be.
Drawing upon salient examples from Hollywood and other cinemas, we have proposed that 
on the level of cinematography, editing and performance, the traditional techniques—and 
the theoretical frameworks that we use to understand them—are retained in a manner that 
is both helpful (as are the concepts of remediation and simulation), but also deceptive. For, 
as per our détournement of the skeuomorph as a metaphor through which to understand 
digital cinema, these tendencies occult what is truly novel about cinema in the digital age. 
Namely, cinema is freed definitively from the camera whilst retaining perceptual realism; 
it is freed from the cut, even if it remains as a convention; and it explodes the concept 
of the actor into what Fleming (2012) characterises as a swarm or a galaxy of performing 
flesh and digital bodies. To evoke Marx once again, all that is solid has now melted into 
gaseous air. In this sense, while discourse surrounding digital cinema can either be 
evangelical or hyperbolic in its insistence upon the new, which in turn produces corrective, 
‘archaeological’ arguments that point to the continuities between digital and analogue 
cinema, we would argue that the digital is skeuomorphic. That is, the retention of old 
techniques and conceptual frameworks is useful, but it also blinds us to what is truly novel 
about digital cinema.
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Notes
[1] Simulation is of course a useful concept, and it does apply to our understanding of 
contemporary cinema, but perhaps only in its most extreme manifestation, as per Mark B. N. 
Hansen’s Bergsonian take on digital imaging in Virtual Reality (VR). For Hansen, VR marks 
out a post-medium mutation of the analogue cinema. Thus, if historically photography and 
cinema were materially inscribed images (or indices) created for the ‘subsequent perception 
by the spectator’s simulated consciousness’, digital VR becomes an advanced and doubly 
articulated form of simulated perception, wherein a digital simulation folds directly into a 
human consciousness/simulation (Hansen, 2014: 170).
[2] Various recent news reports have suggested that scientists increasingly believe 
dinosaurs to have been feathered. In other words, the lizard-like scales that the dinosaurs 
in Jurassic Park possess could in fact be unrealistic based on the best available evidence—
even though the creatures are still upheld, not least for their convincing style of movement, 
as realistic computer-generated effects. See, inter alia, Gill (2010), Handwerk (2009) and 
Science Daily (2007).
[3] The logic of premediation perhaps reaches its apogee in conspiracy theories that believe 
films featuring alien invasions are ‘preparing us’ for an inevitable and imminent ‘contact’ with 
aliens and/or invasion. It is not that these conspiracy theories are worth taking seriously (we 
will be happy to eat our words if they turn out to be true). Rather, they demonstrate the way 
in which premediation extends beyond us, never being caught unawares to us, knowing 
already that we will never be caught unawares.
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